The PRI Academic Seminar Series invites leading ESG experts to present their research to academic scholars and investors.
The aim of the series is to:
- give world thought leaders in responsible investing the opportunity to present their work and obtain valuable feedback
- provide an opportunity to junior scholars to network with the speaker and obtain career advice
- be more inclusive and strengthen our global PRI Academic Network community throughout the year
Johannes Stroebel, 12 November 2021
Paper: A Quantity-Based Approach to Constructing Climate Risk Hedge Portfolios
Abstract: We propose a new methodology to build portfolios that hedge climate change risks. Our quantity-based approach explores how mutual funds holdings change when the fund adviser experiences a local extreme heat event that shifts beliefs about climate risks. We use the observed trading behavior to predict how investors will reallocate their capital when “global” climate news shocks occur, which shift the beliefs and asset demands of many investors simultaneously and thus move equilibrium prices. We show that a portfolio that holds stocks that investors tend to buy after experiencing a local heat shock appreciates in value in periods with aggregate climate news shocks. Our quantity-based approach yields superior out-of-sample hedging performance compared to traditional methods of identifying hedge portfolios. The key advantage of the quantity-based approach is that it learns from cross-sectional trading responses rather than time-series price information, which is limited in the case of climate risks. We also demonstrate the efficacy and versatility of the quantity-based approach by constructing successful hedge portfolios for aggregate unemployment and house price risk.
About Johannes Stroebel
Johannes Stroebel is the David S. Loeb Professor of Finance and the Boxer Faculty Fellow at the New York University Stern School of Business.
Alex Edmans, 8 October 2021
Paper: CEO Compensation: Evidence From the Field
Abstract: We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and incentive compatibility. These constraints lead to lower pay levels and more one-size-fits-all structures. Shareholders are the main source of constraints, suggesting directors and investors disagree on how to maximize value. Respondents view intrinsic motivation and reputation as stronger motivators than incentive pay. They believe pay matters to CEOs not to finance consumption, but because it affects perceptions of fairness. The need to fairly recognize the CEO’s contribution explains why flow pay responds to performance, even though CEOs’ equity holdings already provide substantial consumption incentives, and why peer firm pay matters beyond retention concerns. Fairness also matters to investors, with shareholder returns an important reference point. This causes CEO pay to be affected by external risks, in contrast to optimal risk sharing.
About Alex Edmans
Alex Edmans is Professor of Finance at London Business School and Academic Director of the Centre for Corporate Governance.